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Choice flexibility and long-run cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • Gabriele Camera

    (Chapman University, Economic Science Institute)

  • Jaehong Kim

    (Xiamen University)

  • David Rojo Arjona

    (University of Leicester)

Abstract

Cooperation does not empirically scale when strangers confront indefinitely repeated social dilemmas—despite its incentive-compatibility. Here, we investigate if an intervention can mitigate this problem: expanding the action set with partial cooperation choices. Although standard theory predicts no effect, adding interior choices to a rigid binary-choice game often boosted cooperation and efficiency in the laboratory. Under some conditions, groups of strangers achieved outcomes close to those observed in pairs of partners—where adding interior choices, instead, was inconsequential. This suggests that choice rigidities can hinder long-run cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Gabriele Camera & Jaehong Kim & David Rojo Arjona, 2026. "Choice flexibility and long-run cooperation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 81(3), pages 937-973, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:81:y:2026:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-025-01672-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-025-01672-2
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    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy

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