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The separability principle in bargaining

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  • Youngsub Chun

Abstract

We investigate the implications of the separability principle in the context of bargaining. For two bargaining problems with the same population, suppose that there is a subgroup of agents who receive the same payoffs in both bargaining problems. Moreover, if we imagine the departure of this subgroup with their payoffs, then the remaining agents face the same opportunities in both bargaining problems. The separability principle requires that under these hypotheses, the remaining agents should receive the same payoffs in both bargaining problems. We begin with investigating the logical relations between separability and two other axioms, contraction independence and consistency. Then, we establish characterizations of the Nash and egalitarian solutions on the basis of separability. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Youngsub Chun, 2005. "The separability principle in bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(1), pages 227-235, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:227-235
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0512-6
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    Cited by:

    1. Yan-An Hwang & Chun-Hsien Yeh, 2012. "A characterization of the nucleolus without homogeneity in airport problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(2), pages 355-364, February.
    2. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Jaume García-Segarra & Miguel Ginés-Vilar, 2018. "Anchoring on Utopia: a generalization of the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(2), pages 141-155, October.
    3. Claus-Jochen Haake & Cheng-Zhong Qin, 2018. "On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem," Working Papers CIE 113, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.

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