IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joecth/v24y2004i2p351-371.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Fair division with no information

Author

Listed:
  • Alain Leroux
  • Justin Leroux

Abstract

We consider a situation in which a central authority must allocate non-tradeable and non-marketable goods between a group of individuals in a fair way. There are exogenous divisibility constraints imposed on the goods to be allocated. The authority has absolutely no information on the preferences of the recipients; moreover, no interaction is allowed among recipients or between the authority and the recipients. Envy-freeness is the equity criterion adopted. Using a remarkable property of simplices (which we introduce and prove) we argue that assigning bundles of equal expected value (forming what is called in this paper the class of “balanced allocations”) is hardly fair unless extra effort is made to discriminate between these proposed allocations. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Alain Leroux & Justin Leroux, 2004. "Fair division with no information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(2), pages 351-371, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:24:y:2004:i:2:p:351-371
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0440-x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-003-0440-x
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00199-003-0440-x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Per Hjertstrand & James Swofford, 2014. "Are the choices of people stochastically rational? A stochastic test of the number of revealed preference violations," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 46(4), pages 1495-1519, June.
    2. Ashish Goel & Adam Meyerson & Thomas Weber, 2009. "Fair welfare maximization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 41(3), pages 465-494, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:24:y:2004:i:2:p:351-371. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.