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Rationalizable variable-population choice functions

Author

Listed:
  • Charles Blackorby

    (Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver BC V6T 1Z1, CANADA, and GREQAM, 2 rue de la Charité, 13002 Marseille, FRANCE)

  • Walter Bossert

    (Département de Sciences Economiques and C.R.D.E., Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-ville, Montréal QC H3C 3J7, CANADA)

  • David Donaldson

    (Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver BC V6T 1Z1, CANADA)

Abstract

We analyze the rationalizability of variable-population social-choice functions in a welfarist framework. It is shown that fixed-population rationalizability and a weakening of congruence together are necessary and sufficient for rational choice, given a plausible dominance property that prevents the choice of alternatives involving low utility levels. In addition, a class of critical-level separable choice functions is characterized. This result, which extends an earlier axiomatization of a related class of bargaining solutions to a variable-population setting, is the first axiomatization of critical-level principles in a general choice-theoretic model.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Blackorby & Walter Bossert & David Donaldson, 2002. "Rationalizable variable-population choice functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(2), pages 355-378.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:19:y:2002:i:2:p:355-378
    Note: Received: November 30, 1999; revised version: September 11, 2000
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Population ethics; Rational choice; Bargaining.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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