Minimal belief change, Pareto-optimality and logical consequence
A rational agent changes her beliefs in response to new information; a widely held idea is that such belief changes should be minimal. This paper is an overview of the theory of minimal belief revision. I employ a decision-theoretic framework to compare various principles for minimal belief revision. The main topics covered include the AGM postulates for belief revision, belief contraction, Grove's representation theorem, axioms for conditionals, and the connections between minimal belief change and questions in formal logic. I characterize under what conditions belief revision functions are consistent with the Levi Identity, and under what conditions belief contraction functions are consistent with the Harper Identity.
Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Note:||Received: August 20, 2000; revised version: March 19, 2001|
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