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Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans

Author

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  • Jülide Yazar

    (Department of Economics, Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, OH 43015, USA)

Abstract

In this paper we introduce a new model of ex ante contracting for economies with asymmetric information to examine endogenously determined communication plans for information sharing in the interim stage. In contrast to the models used in previous research, in the present model agents negotiate not only on a contract of state contingent allocations but also on a communication plan, a set of rules describing how agents will reveal part of their private information at the interim stage to execute the trade contracts. We prove a result about the nested structure of the set of allocations implementable by various communication plans and establish the existence of core strategies for this cooperative game under various regularity conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Jülide Yazar, 2001. "Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 18(2), pages 439-450.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:439-450
    Note: Received: 4 March 1998; revised version: 17 September 1999
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Exchange economies with asymmetric information; Cooperative games; Information processing.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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