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On games with identical equilibrium payoffs

Author

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  • Indrajit Ray

    (Department of Economics, University of York, Heslington, York YO10 5DD, UK)

Abstract

This paper compares the sets of Nash, coalition- proof Nash and strong Nash equilibrium payoffs of normal form games which are closely related. We propose sufficient conditions for equivalent or closely related games to have identical sets of equilibrium payoffs.

Suggested Citation

  • Indrajit Ray, 2001. "On games with identical equilibrium payoffs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 17(1), pages 223-231.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:17:y:2001:i:1:p:223-231
    Note: Received: April 23, 1999; revised version: November 23, 1999
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