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Some factors affecting demand withholding in posted-offer markets

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  • Bradley J. Ruffle

    () (Department of Economics, P.O. Box 653, Ben-Gurion University, Beer Sheva, 84105, ISRAEL)

Abstract

Both oligopoly theory and experiments are concerned almost uniquely with sellers' behavior. Buyers' ability to exhibit non-trivial behavior in different market institutions remains unaddressed. This paper investigates the impact of three variables (number of buyers, surplus division at the market-clearing price and information revelation) on strategic and fairness-motivated demand withholding. Demand withholding and its ability to force lower prices increase as the number of buyers or the share of surplus earned by the buyers decreases. However, increasing the information revealed to subjects about the surplus inequality favoring sellers mildly facilitates collusion among sellers rather than provoking demand withholding as conjectured.

Suggested Citation

  • Bradley J. Ruffle, 2000. "Some factors affecting demand withholding in posted-offer markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 16(3), pages 529-544.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:16:y:2000:i:3:p:529-544
    Note: Received: March 27, 1999; revised version: October 26, 1999
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Douglas D. Davis & Oleg Korenok, 2009. "Posted Offer Markets In Near-Continuous Time: An Experimental Investigation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(3), pages 449-466, July.
    2. Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata & Nikiforakis, Nikos, 2011. "Can real-effort investments inhibit the convergence of experimental markets?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 97-103, January.
    3. Jim Engle-Warnick & Bradley Ruffle, 2006. "Buyer Concentration As A Source Of Countervailing Power: Evidence From Experimental Posted-Offer Markets," Departmental Working Papers 2006-12, McGill University, Department of Economics.
    4. Bradley J. Ruffle, 2005. "Buyer Countervailing Power: A Survey of Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 0512, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    5. Jim Engle-Warnick & Bradley Ruffle, 2002. "Buyer Countervailing Power versus Monopoly Power: Evidence from Experimental Posted-Offer Markets," Economics Papers 2002-W14, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    6. Hans-Theo Normann & Bradley J. Ruffle & Christopher M. Snyder, 2007. "Do buyer-size discounts depend on the curvature of the surplus function? Experimental tests of bargaining models," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 747-767, September.
    7. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath & Wieland Müller, 2014. "Taxation and Market Power," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 47(1), pages 173-202, February.
    8. Jean-Robert Tyran & Dirk Engelmann, 2005. "To Buy or Not to Buy? An Experimental Study of Consumer Boycotts in Retail Markets," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 72(285), pages 1-16, February.
    9. Morgan, John & Orzen, Henrik & Sefton, Martin, 2006. "An experimental study of price dispersion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 134-158, January.
    10. Yuecheng Yu & Alexander Pelaez & Karl R. Lang, 2016. "Designing and evaluating business process models: an experimental approach," Information Systems and e-Business Management, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 767-789, November.
    11. Orland, Andreas & Selten, Reinhard, 2016. "Buyer power in bilateral oligopolies with advance production: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 31-42.
    12. Sara Fisher Ellison & Christopher M. Snyder, 2010. "COUNTERVAILING POWER IN WHOLESALE PHARMACEUTICALS -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 32-53, March.
    13. Brokesova, Zuzana & Deck, Cary & Peliova, Jana, 2014. "Experimenting with purchase history based price discrimination," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 229-237.
    14. Davis, Douglas D. & Wilson, Bart J., 2008. "Strategic buyers, horizontal mergers and synergies: An experimental investigation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 643-661, May.
    15. Klaus Adam, 2001. "Competitive Prices in Markets with Search and Information Frictions," CSEF Working Papers 55, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    16. Lisa Bruttel, 2014. "Buyer power in large buyer groups?," TWI Research Paper Series 92, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
    17. Cason, Timothy N. & Friedman, Daniel, 2003. "Buyer search and price dispersion: a laboratory study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 232-260, October.
    18. Jim Engle-Warnick & Bradley Ruffle, 2006. "The Strategies Behind Their Actions: A Method To Infer Repeated-Game Strategies And An Application To Buyer Behavior," Departmental Working Papers 2005-04, McGill University, Department of Economics.
    19. Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, 2003. "In Honor of Matthew Rabin: Winner of the John Bates Clark Medal," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 159-176, Summer.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic buyer behavior; Demand withholding; Fairness; Reference profit.;

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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