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Manipulation-proof equilibrium in atomless economies with commodity differentiation


  • Mário Rui Páscoa

    () (Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Travessa Estêv ao Pinto . P-1099-032 Lisboa, PORTUGAL)

  • Carlos Hervés-Beloso

    (Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad de Vigo, Aptdo 874, E-36200 Vigo, SPAIN)

  • Emma Moreno-García

    () (Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Travessa Estêv ao Pinto . P-1099-032 Lisboa, PORTUGAL)


In this paper, we introduce a perfect competition test which checks the incentives of arbitrarily small coalitions to behave strategically in endowments and preferences. We apply this coalitional incentive compatibility test to atomless economies with a continuum of differentiated commodities. We show that, under thickness conditions, economies with a finite number of types and economies whose set of agents' preferences is compact, pass this perfect competition test. Limiting results for replica economies are also presented.

Suggested Citation

  • Mário Rui Páscoa & Carlos Hervés-Beloso & Emma Moreno-García, 1999. "Manipulation-proof equilibrium in atomless economies with commodity differentiation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 14(3), pages 545-563.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:14:y:1999:i:3:p:545-563
    Note: Received: July 25, 1997; revised version: December 5, 1998

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    Cited by:

    1. Hervés-Beloso, Carlos & Moreno-Garci­a, Emma, 2008. "Competitive equilibria and the grand coalition," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 697-706, July.
    2. Herves-Beloso, Carlos & Moreno-Garcia, Emma & Nunez-Sanz, Carmelo & Rui Pascoa, Mario, 2000. "Blocking Efficacy of Small Coalitions in Myopic Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 72-86, July.

    More about this item


    Perfect competition; Continuum economies; Incentive compatibility; Thick markets; Walrasian equilibrium.;

    JEL classification:

    • D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies


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