Convergence of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler and Geanakoplos bargaining sets
Geanakoplos  defined a notion of bargaining set, and proved that his bargaining set is approximately competitive in large finite transferable utility (TU) exchange economies with smooth preferences. Shapley and Shubik  showed that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set is approximately competitive in replica sequences of TU exchange economies with smooth preferences. We extend Geanakoplos' result to nontransferable utility (NTU) exchange economies without smooth preferences, and we extend the Shapley and Shubik result to non-replica sequences of NTU exchange economies with smooth preferences.
Volume (Year): 11 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Note:||Received: November 11, 1996|
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