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Uninsured idiosyncratic risk, liquidity constraints and aggregate fluctuations


  • Javier DÎaz-GimÊnez

    (Departamento de EconomÎa, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Calle Madrid 126, E-28903 Getafe, SPAIN)


I study the role played by uninsured idiosyncratic risk and liquidity constraints in the propagation of aggregate fluctuations. To this purpose, I compare the aggregate fluctuations of two model economies that differ in their insurance technologies only. In one of these model economies liquidity constrained households vary their holdings of a nominally denominated asset in order to buffer an uninsured idiosyncratic shock to their individual production opportunities. In the other economy every idiosyncratic component of risk can be costlessly insured. I find that the limited insurance technology implies fluctuations in output that are 20% larger, fluctuations in hours relative to output that are 9% larger, fluctuations in consumption relative to output that are 18% smaller, and a correlation of hours and productivity that is 15% smaller than those that obtain under the full insurance technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Javier DÎaz-GimÊnez, 1997. "Uninsured idiosyncratic risk, liquidity constraints and aggregate fluctuations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(3), pages 463-482.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:10:y:1997:i:3:p:463-482 Note: Received: March 6, 1996; revised version August 15, 1996

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    Cited by:

    1. Bornukova, Kateryna, 2009. "Real Business Cycles in The Model with Two-Person Household and Home Production," MPRA Paper 25113, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Alfonso Novales, 2000. "The role of simulation methods in Macroeconomics," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 155-181.
    3. Gomes, Joao & Greenwood, Jeremy & Rebelo, Sergio, 2001. "Equilibrium unemployment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 109-152, August.
    4. Javier Díaz-Giménez & Luis Puch, 1998. "Borrowing constraints in economies with household capital and banking: an application to the Spanish housing market (1982-1988)," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 22(3), pages 469-499, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy


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