Kantian dignity and social economics
Many social economists endorse the ethics of Immanuel Kant, specifically his emphasis on the dignity of humanity and the equal respect due all persons. Based on these tenets, Kant mandates a social outlook in which concern for others, characterized by negative duties of respect and positive duties of beneficence, are broadly required of all rational agents. However, some of the positions that social economists derive from Kantian dignity actually violate it, such as support for a welfare state and opposition to the institution of wage employment. I will show that both of these positions are inconsistent with the traditional understanding of Kantian dignity, suggesting that social economists should either ground their positions on a different concept of dignity, or revise them to remain consistent with Kant's specific sense of dignity.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Volume (Year): 32 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/12143|
|Order Information:||Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lanse Minkler, 2001. "Review Essay on Economics for the Common Good," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 59(1), pages 103-108.
- Edward O'Boyle, 2001. "Personalist Economics: Unorthodox and Counter-Cultural," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 59(4), pages 367-393.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:fosoec:v:32:y:2003:i:2:p:1-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.