IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/envman/v38y2006i1d10.1007_s00267-005-0165-7.html

Socially Strategic Ecological Restoration: A Game-Theoretic Analysis Shortened: Socially Strategic Restoration

Author

Listed:
  • Mark Buckley

    (University of California, Santa Cruz, Department of Environmental Studies)

  • Brent M. Haddad

    (University of California, Santa Cruz, Department of Environmental Studies)

Abstract

Major transitions in a multiple-use or mosaic landscape often lead to frictions among new and existing users. In this article, we consider the problem of ecological restoration within a mosaic landscape in which restoration activities elicit feedbacks from individuals and groups that are harmed by restoration outcomes. Using game theory, we identify three potential outcomes ranked by the extent of restoration of ecosystem services and processes: nonstrategic, noncooperative strategic equilibrium, and cooperative bargaining solution. We identify conditions under which additional restoration can decrease the overall flow of ecosystem services and processes. A “strategic restorationist” will cease new restoration activities when the net effect of defensive response moves by farmers offsets gains. Imperfect information regarding expected payoffs to farmers can lead to inefficient overshooting or undershooting the optimal scale, geographical positioning, and form of restoration. Gains to all parties from cooperation might exist. As a case study and to aid model design, we consider restoration activities on California’s upper Sacramento River.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Buckley & Brent M. Haddad, 2006. "Socially Strategic Ecological Restoration: A Game-Theoretic Analysis Shortened: Socially Strategic Restoration," Environmental Management, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 48-61, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:envman:v:38:y:2006:i:1:d:10.1007_s00267-005-0165-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s00267-005-0165-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00267-005-0165-7
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00267-005-0165-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:envman:v:38:y:2006:i:1:d:10.1007_s00267-005-0165-7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.