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The effect of exploiting the public good on climate cooperation: evidence from a collective-risk social dilemma experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Janis Cloos

    (PricewaterhouseCoopers GmbH Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft, Data Analytics & Digital Transformation)

  • Matthias Greiff

    (Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre)

  • Karol Kempa

    (FS-UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate & Sustainable Energy Finance, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management)

Abstract

Reaching ambitious climate targets is challenging, due the individual incentives of countries to free ride and to continue contributing to climate change. This issue of climate change has been analyzed in collective-risk social dilemma (CRSD) experiments, where participants interact in groups and can invest money in a group account over a fixed number of rounds. If the group account is below a threshold after the last round, the group members lose a large proportion of their assets. In the real world, however, agents can not only invest in public goods, but also exploit them. We argue that this possibility reduces the likelihood to reach the threshold. To test this prediction, we introduce the option to also exploit the public good in a CRSD experiment. The results reveal that a take option negatively affects the likelihood of reaching the threshold. Overall, the effect of the existence of a take option is rather small and not statistically significant. However, if participants exert their option to exploit the public good at the beginning, the success rate drops significantly. Consistent with the results of previous studies without the option of exploiting the public good, we find that a lower loss rate makes cooperation less likely, but the effect of heterogeneity is less clear. Our findings indicate that CRSD experiments that do not consider exploitation are likely to overestimate the likelihood of successful cooperation. The key implication for policy is to focus on reducing the incentives of the take option.

Suggested Citation

  • Janis Cloos & Matthias Greiff & Karol Kempa, 2026. "The effect of exploiting the public good on climate cooperation: evidence from a collective-risk social dilemma experiment," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 28(10), pages 25201-25220, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:endesu:v:28:y:2026:i:10:d:10.1007_s10668-024-05949-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10668-024-05949-9
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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