Risk aversion in green energy-efficient vehicle-petrol supply chain based on C-VaR model with government intervention: a game theoretic approach

Due to ongoing economic and business changes and intense competition in the vehicle industry, the market potential for vehicle demand remains uncertain. This introduces a decision-making risk for parts of the vehicle and petrol supply chains. The present study aimed to explore how decisions in these supply chains, influenced by sustainability and risk aversion, impact the selling price of cars, demand, and profit. To address the inherent risks in the vehicle and petrol industries, and recognize the advantages of the C-VaR method, a novel chance constraint-based risk aversion model was developed using C-VaR for these supply chains. Additionally, the study explored the impact of investing in energy-efficient technologies for cars on members’ profits. To these ends, the relationship between the two supply chains was examined based on the Nash model, comparing member behavior in situations with and without risk aversion. The results indicated that under conditions of risk aversion, decisions are more precise, leading to higher profits for members. Notably, government support for the vehicle supply chain, driven by the desire to produce energy-efficient vehicles, serves as a coordination and profitability mechanism. Note that this study pioneers the application of risk models for a risk aversion model. Finally, a comprehensive numerical experimentation was performed to assess the effect of risk aversion on the proficiency of supply chain members. Graphical abstract