Dynamic game strategies and coordination of closed-loop supply chain considering product remanufacturing and goodwill in the big data environment

In conjunction with the rapid development of big data technology, many big data service providers (BDSPs) have been widely integrated into closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs). This study examines the role of BDSPs in a dynamic CLSC that employs a manufacturer for recycling and remanufacturing, a retailer for retailing, and a BDSP for providing big data services such as site selection for recycling. In the presence of stochastic disturbances, the Itô process is used to describe the dynamic evolution of recycling ratios. Differential game models are presented that decentralize independently without a BDSP (scenario D) and with a BDSP (scenario B) and introduce a coordinating contract that combines wholesale price discount and cost-sharing (scenario C). Furthermore, we explore the decisional differences between the three scenarios, the contract’s effects, and sensitivity to parameters by using comparative and numerical analysis. The findings indicate that BDSPs participation in CLSCs could positively affect recycling ratios and supply chain profits, and an increase in the volatility of recycling ratios could be beneficial to manufacturers and retailers. In addition, the designed contract is likely to reduce retail prices, enhance recycling ratios, and contribute to Pareto improvements. Sustainability can be attained in a way that maximizes profits and minimizes environmental impact by properly using the proposed model. Enterprises are recommended to work with BDSPs to enhance their goodwill because BDSPs facilitate the use of big data marketing for increasing sales and recycling ratios, thereby promoting sustainable economic development and environmental protection.