The Impact of Value-Based Payment Models for Networks of Care and Transmural Care: A Systematic Literature Review

Introduction Value-based healthcare has potential for cost control and quality improvement. To assess this, we review the evidence on the impact of value-based payment (VBP) models in the context of networks of care (NOC) and transmural care. Methods We used the PRISMA guidelines for this systematic literature review. We searched eight databases in July 2021. Subsequently, we conducted title and abstract and full-text screenings, and extracted information in an extraction matrix. Based on this, we assessed the evidence on the effects of VBP models on clinical outcomes, patient-reported outcomes/experiences, organization-related outcomes/experiences, and costs. Additionally, we reviewed the facilitating and inhibiting factors per VBP model. Findings Among articles studying shared savings and pay-for-performance models, most outline positive effects on both clinical and cost outcomes, such as preventable hospitalizations and total expenditures, respectively. Most studies show no change in patient satisfaction and access to care when adopting VBP models. Providers’ opinions towards the models are frequently negative. Transparency and communication among involved stakeholders are found to be key facilitating factors, transversal to all models. Additionally, a lack of trust is an inhibitor found in all VBP models, together with inadequate targets and insufficient incentives. In bundled payment and pay-for-performance models, complexity in the structure of the program and lack of experience in implementing required mechanisms are key inhibitors. Conclusions The overall positive effect on clinical and cost outcomes validates the success of VBP models. The mostly negative effects on organization-reported outcomes/experiences are corroborated by findings regarding providers’ lack of awareness, trust, and engagement with the model. This may be justified by their exclusion from the design of the models, decreasing their sense of ownership and, therefore, motivation. Incentives, targets, benchmarks, and quality measures, if adequately designed, seem to be important facilitators, and if lacking or inadequate, they are key inhibitors. These are prominent facilitators and inhibitors for P4P and shared savings models but not as prominent for bundled payments. The complexity of the scheme and lack of experience are prominent inhibitors in all VBP models, since all require changes in several areas, such as behavioral, process, and infrastructure.