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Dynamic games of fiscal and monetary policiesfor Austria

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  • R. Neck

Abstract

This paper considers a dynamic game between fiscal policy (the government) and monetarypolicy (the central bank). Both policy‐makers are assumed to optimize quadratic intertemporalobjective functions; they attach different weights to the targets employment andprice stability. An econometric model of the Austrian economy is the dynamic system uponwhich fiscal and monetary policies act. Numerical time paths of control and endogenousvariables are calculated for non‐cooperative (open‐loop and feedback Nash and Stackelbergequilibria) and cooperative solutions. It is shown that the outcomes of these solutions entailmore countercyclical policies than a projection of the model. There are only small differencesbetween the results of the solution concepts considered. The position of the government isstronger than that of the central bank as regards their influence on macroeconomic targetvariables. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

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  • R. Neck, 1999. "Dynamic games of fiscal and monetary policiesfor Austria," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 88(0), pages 233-249, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:88:y:1999:i:0:p:233-249:10.1023/a:1018934530788
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1018934530788
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    Cited by:

    1. Muhammad Ali Nasir & Alaa M. Soliman & Muhammad Shahbaz, 2021. "Operational aspect of the policy coordination for financial stability: role of Jeffreys–Lindley’s paradox in operations research," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 306(1), pages 57-81, November.

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