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A strategic approach to bankruptcy problems based on the TAL family of rules

Author

Listed:
  • Dirck Bouwhuis

    (Tilburg University, Department of Econometrics and Operations Research and CentER)

  • Peter Borm

    (Tilburg University, Department of Econometrics and Operations Research and CentER)

  • Ruud Hendrickx

    (Tilburg University, Department of Econometrics and Operations Research and CentER)

Abstract

This paper analyzes bankruptcy problems from a strategic perspective using the parameterized TAL family of bankruptcy rules. We construct a strategic game where every player selects a parameter, and the rule from the TAL family that corresponds to the mean of the chosen parameters is used to divide the estate. We prove the existence of Nash equilibria for this strategic game. In particular, we provide the set of all Nash equilibria for two players, and for more players, we prove existence by constructing a Nash equilibrium of a particular form based on the notion of a pivotal player.

Suggested Citation

  • Dirck Bouwhuis & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx, 2026. "A strategic approach to bankruptcy problems based on the TAL family of rules," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 356(1), pages 85-104, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:356:y:2026:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-024-05906-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-024-05906-9
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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