IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/annopr/v352y2025i1d10.1007_s10479-025-06748-9.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Bias in the ballot: how votemandering exploits gerrymandering and campaign strategies

Author

Listed:
  • Sanyukta Deshpande

    (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)

  • Ian G. Ludden

    (Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology)

  • Sheldon H. Jacobson

    (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)

Abstract

Gerrymandering—the deliberate manipulation of electoral district boundaries for political advantage—is a persistent challenge in U.S. elections. In this work, we introduce and analyze Votemandering, a strategic blend of gerrymandering and targeted political campaigning devised to gain more seats by circumventing fairness measures. Votemandering leverages accurate demographic and socio-political data, bolstered by advancements in technology and data analytics, to influence voter decisions in pursuit of subtle gerrymandering strategies. We formulate votemandering as a Mixed Integer Program (MIP) that performs fairness-constrained gerrymandering over multiple election rounds. We analyze the influence of various redistricting constraints and parameters on votemandering efficacy. We explore the interconnectedness of gerrymandering, substantial campaign budgets, and strategic campaigning, illustrating their collective potential to generate biased electoral maps. A case study of Wisconsin State Senate redistricting reveals significant votemandering potential. Our findings underscore the need for reforms in the redistricting process beyond enforcing thresholds for specific fairness metrics.

Suggested Citation

  • Sanyukta Deshpande & Ian G. Ludden & Sheldon H. Jacobson, 2025. "Bias in the ballot: how votemandering exploits gerrymandering and campaign strategies," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 352(1), pages 121-168, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:352:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-025-06748-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-025-06748-9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10479-025-06748-9
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10479-025-06748-9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rahul Swamy & Douglas M. King & Sheldon H. Jacobson, 2023. "Multiobjective Optimization for Politically Fair Districting: A Scalable Multilevel Approach," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 71(2), pages 536-562, March.
    2. Karp, Jeffrey A. & Banducci, Susan A. & Bowler, Shaun, 2008. "Getting Out the Vote: Party Mobilization in a Comparative Perspective," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 91-112, January.
    3. Gerber, Alan S. & Green, Donald P., 2000. "The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(3), pages 653-663, September.
    4. Levitt, Steven D, 1994. "Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 777-798, August.
    5. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    6. Steve Bickerstaff, 2020. "Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide," Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer, number 978-3-030-30837-7, March.
    7. Z. Landau & O. Reid & I. Yershov, 2009. "A fair division solution to the problem of redistricting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 479-492, March.
    8. Moshe Babaioff & Noam Nisan & Inbal Talgam-Cohen, 2021. "Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 46(1), pages 382-403, February.
    9. Scott Macdonell & Nick Mastronardi, 2015. "Waging simple wars: a complete characterization of two-battlefield Blotto equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 183-216, January.
    10. Alexander J. Stewart & Mohsen Mosleh & Marina Diakonova & Antonio A. Arechar & David G. Rand & Joshua B. Plotkin, 2019. "Information gerrymandering and undemocratic decisions," Nature, Nature, vol. 573(7772), pages 117-121, September.
    11. Alan Gerber & Donald Green, 2000. "The effects of canvassing, direct mail, and telephone contact on voter turnout: A field experiment," Natural Field Experiments 00248, The Field Experiments Website.
    12. Chambers, Christopher P. & Miller, Alan D., 2013. "Measuring legislative boundaries," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 268-275.
    13. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Julia Cage & Edgard Dewitte, 2021. "It Takes Money to Make MPs: Evidence from 150 Years of British Campaign Spending," Working Papers hal-03384143, HAL.
    2. Michael Haman, 2021. "Recall Elections: A Tool of Accountability? Evidence from Peru," Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad, Universidad de los Andes,Facultad de Economía, CEDE, vol. 87(3).
    3. Julia Cage & Yasmine Bekkouche, 2018. "The Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03393149, HAL.
    4. Bekkouche, Yasmine & Cagé, Julia & Dewitte, Edgard, 2022. "The heterogeneous price of a vote: Evidence from multiparty systems, 1993–2017," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    5. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1dp7827s4n8ht8fk3qhmeuvd0o is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Alan Gerber, 2004. "Does campaign spending work?," Natural Field Experiments 00246, The Field Experiments Website.
    7. Bekkouche, Yasmine & Cagé, Julia & Dewitte, Edgard, 2022. "The heterogeneous price of a vote: Evidence from multiparty systems, 1993–2017," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    8. Cagé, Julia & Bekkouche, Yasmine, 2018. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," CEPR Discussion Papers 12614, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/2ahul47tb09rvqfl9eelv7o5ca is not listed on IDEAS
    10. John Maloney & Andrew Pickering, 2013. "Political Competition, Political Donations, Economic Policy and Growth," Discussion Papers 13/21, Department of Economics, University of York.
    11. Alan Gerber & Daniel Kessler & Marc Meredith, 2008. "The Persuasive Effects of Direct Mail: A Regression Discontinuity Approach," NBER Working Papers 14206, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Brett Gordon & Mitchell Lovett & Ron Shachar & Kevin Arceneaux & Sridhar Moorthy & Michael Peress & Akshay Rao & Subrata Sen & David Soberman & Oleg Urminsky, 2012. "Marketing and politics: Models, behavior, and policy implications," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 391-403, June.
    13. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/10lirmbd5p8h4ae52oi51b4cka is not listed on IDEAS
    14. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/1dp7827s4n8ht8fk3qhmeuvd0o is not listed on IDEAS
    15. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2ahul47tb09rvqfl9eelv7o5ca is not listed on IDEAS
    16. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/1dp7827s4n8ht8fk3qhmeuvd0o is not listed on IDEAS
    17. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/2ahul47tb09rvqfl9eelv7o5ca is not listed on IDEAS
    18. John Maloney & Andrew Pickering, 2018. "The Economic Consequences of Political Donation Limits," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 85(339), pages 479-517, July.
    19. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/2ahul47tb09rvqfl9eelv7o5ca is not listed on IDEAS
    20. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/10lirmbd5p8h4ae52oi51b4cka is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage, 2018. "The Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," Working Papers Series 68, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    22. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/1dp7827s4n8ht8fk3qhmeuvd0o is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Hermann Schmitt & Sara Hobolt & Sebastian Adrian Popa, 2015. "Does personalization increase turnout? Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 European Parliament elections," European Union Politics, , vol. 16(3), pages 347-368, September.
    24. Erlanson, Albin & Szwagrzak, Karol, 2013. "Strategy-Proof Package Assignment," Working Papers 2013:43, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    25. Felix Brandt & Patrick Lederer & René Romen, 2024. "Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(1), pages 19-55, August.
    26. Bock, Hans-Hermann & Day, William H. E. & McMorris, F. R., 1998. "Consensus rules for committee elections," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 219-232, May.
    27. León, Gianmarco, 2017. "Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Peru," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 56-71.
    28. Marco LiCalzi, 2022. "Bipartite choices," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 45(2), pages 551-568, December.
    29. John C. McCabe-Dansted & Arkadii Slinko, 2006. "Exploratory Analysis of Similarities Between Social Choice Rules," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 77-107, January.
    30. James Schummer, 1999. "Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation," Discussion Papers 1278, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:352:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-025-06748-9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.