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Yolsuzluk Olgusunun Ortaya Çıkmasında Asimetrik Bilginin Rolü: Teorik Bir Bakış Açısı

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  • Enver Alper GÜVEL
  • Ahmet Yılmaz ATA

Abstract

Difference of information among economic agents leads one side to have more information relatively to the other side in economic transactions. The issue of asymmetric information may cause market failure like corruption. In this framework, the existence of asymmetric information could lay the groundwork for opportunism in economic transactions and increase transaction costs. Therefore the circumstances of corruption come out. Economic agents make a benefit of information superiority because of their institutions of self-interesting. In this paper, the effect of asymmetric information in economic structure on the issue of corruption is analyzed. In this context, this effect is evaluated in the framework of two kind of microeconomic methods such as “Principal- Agents Model” and “Game Theory”.

Suggested Citation

  • Enver Alper GÜVEL & Ahmet Yılmaz ATA, 2009. "Yolsuzluk Olgusunun Ortaya Çıkmasında Asimetrik Bilginin Rolü: Teorik Bir Bakış Açısı," Sosyoekonomi Journal, Sosyoekonomi Society, issue 2009-1.
    • Handle: RePEc:sos:sosjrn:090109
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    Keywords

    Corruption; Asymmetric Information; Game Theory.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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