The phenomenon of corrupt pricing.On some aspects of institutional regulation (experience of the Russian Federation)

Based on the study of Russian economic and corporate governance practice, as well as the judicial practice corresponding to it in the zone of the selected problematic, the article undertakes a fragmentary analysis of the phenomenon called by the author “corruption pricing” - the formation by the competent management bodies of companies and their interconnected groups of prices for relevant goods, works and services that, according to the initial perception and formal criteria, satisfy the parties of the transaction, however, upon a more thorough analysis, they turn out to be inconsistent with the interests of significant agents of the corporation system, including title co-owners and beneficiaries of business entities, realizing exclusively the interests of a narrow group of persons, capable of unfairly influencing on the legal process of price formation. Turning to specific cases, the author puts forward a hypothesis regarding the inevitability of institutional restrictions of the freedom of pricing in a market (non-state) pricing zone, predetermined by the circumstances of the objective discrepancy between the motives of investment and professional participation in entrepreneurial activity in general and management practice, in particular, of its various subjects - business owners and service providers. their top managers, majority and minority investors, personnel and administration, customers and service providers in the order of outsourcing and the associated need for a creative interpretation of the principles of integrity and reasonableness and their summarizing principle - economic justice.