Prolegomena For A Definition Of The Structural Concept Of Legal Liability

In an epistemological horizon still unstable in terms of knowing the meanings and interdisciplinary valences of legal responsibility we will try in this study to formulate a new proposal regarding the level of abstraction of this metatheoretical concept. Our attempt is all the more difficult as professor D.C. D¾ni¿or outlined the limits and conditions of legalizing concepts, the scientific impasse being that legal doctrine and jurisprudence tend to use illegal concepts in legal argumentation, without ensuring "proper reshuffle of in order to transfer them from one sphere of knowledge to another." In the following we will try to show the correlations that the idea of legal responsibility maintains with the philosophical foundations of law, with its original values, with its linguistic and ethical meanings, with man as reality and anthropological and sociological subject in permanent relations with the social community and, especially, with the supreme purpose of law - human dignity, starting from a series of definitions and descriptions that have been imposed in the general theory of law. Finally, in order to overcome the stage of research on the level of knowledge of the meanings, functions and epistemic values of legal liability, we will propose a new concept, namely the structural concept of legal liability, which traditionally does not appear in the formulation of scientific statements whereas - as professor Sofia Popescu observed - "these concepts allow a further refinement, in even more abstract concepts, the conceptual system allowing legal solutions for any new situation."