The New Institutionalist Response To The Problems Of Fisheries: State Of Art On Individual Transferable Quotas
Most of the world’s fisheries are at least fully exploited. The main causal factor of this situation is the lack of a regulative institutional ambient in the fishing industry that, without well defined rules of the game, followed in recent decades a combined trend of marine resources overexploitation and inefficient economic results. The aim of this paper is to analyze the institutional regulation as a source of solutions to major problems of modern fishing that, in this document, we identify as overfishing and overcapitalization of the fishing sector. Furthermore, in this regulatory framework we will present the importance of institutions, property rights and incentive structure linked to both as a fundamental part of the institutional action in fishery. Realizing the importance of institutional action in the regulation of fishery, we will analyze a specific institutional mechanism: Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) as a reflect of institutions and property rights action applied to the practice of fishery governance.
Volume (Year): 20 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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