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Модель концессии на производство общественного блага . Model of a concession mechanism for a public good production

Author

Listed:
  • Хуторецкий А. Б.

    (Новосибирский государственный университет)

  • Гайлит Е. В.

    (Новосибирский государственный педагогический университет)

Abstract

Предложен механизм концессии на развитие и эксплуатацию мощности по производству общественного блага: концессионер оплачивает затраты, получает премию за каждую единицу удовлетворенной потребности и платит штраф за каждую единицу неудовлетворенной потребности. Описана игровая модель, в которой государство определяет премию и штраф, а концессионер ― мощность. Единственное равновесие по Штакельбергу обеспечивает заданный уровень удовлетворения потребности и компенсацию затрат концессионера. We examine a game model of the following concession mechanism for a public good production. Concessionaire invests in development the productive capacity and finances the operating and production costs. Concedent pays concessionaire a bonus for each unit of the satisfied demand, and concessionaire pays concedent a penalty for each unit of unsatisfied demand. In the unique Staсkelberg equilibrium, the required rate of satisfied demand are met and the concessionaire’s expenses are recovered.

Suggested Citation

  • Хуторецкий А. Б. & Гайлит Е. В., 2013. "Модель концессии на производство общественного блага . Model of a concession mechanism for a public good production," Мир экономики и управления // Вестник НГУ. Cерия: Cоциально-экономические науки, Socionet;Новосибирский государственный университет, vol. 13(2), pages 5-13.
    • Handle: RePEc:scn:guhrje:2013_2_01
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