IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Study Of Signalling Games On The Labour Force Market Of Eu-27,The Pure Strategy Case


  • Stelian STANCU

    (Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania)

  • Tudorel ANDREI

    (Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania)

  • Oana Madalina PREDESCU

    (Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania)

  • George Viorel VOINESCU

    (Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania)


The paper addresses several key issues in the field of game theory, namely: determination of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium for signaling games - the pure strategy case; signaling on the labor force market; application of the signaling game on the labor force market of EU-27. The analysis of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium for signaling games - the pure strategy case has lead to the following conclusion: if the Sender strategy is unifying or separating then the equilibrium will be called unifying or, respectively separating.In the section Signaling on the labor force market, there are issues regarding the complete information case, where we suppose that the worker’s ability is common information for all players, but also issues regarding the incomplete information case. Three types of perfect Bayesian equilibriums may exist in this last model: unifying equilibrium, when both types of workers choose a single type of education; separating equilibrium, when the perfect Bayesian equilibrium is separating by itself, and hybrid equilibrium, if a worker chooses a level of education with certainty, the other one may randomly choose between joining the fist one (by selecting the level of education of the first type) and getting separated from him (by selecting a different level of education).This analysis allows us to draw the following conclusions: in case of signaling games on the labor force market, the pure strategy case, three types of equilibriums are available: unifying, separating and hybrid; as the worker’s ability is private information, this allows a low ability worker to pretend to be a high ability worker; the low ability workers find it more difficult to accumulate additional education requiring higher wages in return; besides the classical separating equilibrium, same as for the unifying equilibrium, there are other separating equilibriums implying a different educational choice by the high ability worker; sometimes the separating equilibrium becomes the limit of the hybrid equilibrium. The application is meant to strengthen, at least partially, given the lack of consistent data, the theoretical results.

Suggested Citation

  • Stelian STANCU & Tudorel ANDREI & Oana Madalina PREDESCU & George Viorel VOINESCU, 2010. "Study Of Signalling Games On The Labour Force Market Of Eu-27,The Pure Strategy Case," The Annals of the "Stefan cel Mare" University of Suceava. Fascicle of The Faculty of Economics and Public Administration, "Stefan cel Mare" University of Suceava, Romania, Faculty of Economics and Public Administration, vol. 10(2(12)), pages 61-70, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:scm:ausvfe:v:10:y:2010:i:2(12):p:61-70

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:,nr.2(12),2010%20fulltext.pdf
    Download Restriction: no


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:scm:ausvfe:v:10:y:2010:i:2(12):p:61-70. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Liviu Scutariu). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.