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Paying to Be at the Bridge Table: An Exploration of the Bridge Playing-Sponsor Experience in Mindsport

Author

Listed:
  • Ian McIntosh

    (University of Stirling, UK)

  • Samantha Punch

    (University of Stirling, UK)

  • Cerys Tandy

    (University of Stirling, UK)

Abstract

Recently the card game bridge has become a focus of sociological study including the professionalisation of the game at elite tournament level. This article, based on 11 in-depth interviews with elite bridge sponsors, focuses on playing-sponsors; amateur players who sponsor and also play alongside professional elite players. The playing-sponsor is important for the financing of elite bridge but occupies an, often awkward, role as both a sponsor/employer and a player. The bridge playing-sponsor thus has to negotiate a complex mix of identities as both employer and ‘partner’, being a relatively powerful financial benefactor while simultaneously being widely regarded as the weaker player in the bridge partnership. Such a position involves a degree of ambivalence and a complex power dynamic and status(es) which have to be navigated. This is unusual within mindsport and sport more widely. These issues are explored via a close look at the lived experience of the bridge playing-sponsor. As such it should be of great interest to sociologists of sport, work, leisure, and formalised micro-interaction more generally.

Suggested Citation

  • Ian McIntosh & Samantha Punch & Cerys Tandy, 2025. "Paying to Be at the Bridge Table: An Exploration of the Bridge Playing-Sponsor Experience in Mindsport," Sociological Research Online, , vol. 30(3), pages 691-710, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:socres:v:30:y:2025:i:3:p:691-710
    DOI: 10.1177/13607804241287607
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baron, James N., 1988. "The employment relation as a social relation," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 492-525, December.
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