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How to integrate theories of norm emergence. The example of James S. Coleman’s and Robert C. Ellickson’s theories

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  • Karl-Dieter Opp

Abstract

There are different theories that aim at explaining the emergence of norms (defined as statements about oughtness). It is not known which theory is superior. This paper is a first attempt to propose a new integrated norm theory, based on two plausible and widely accepted theories: James Coleman’s and Robert Ellickson’s theories about the origin of norms. After discussing methodological issues referring, among other things, to arguments for integrating the theories, the new theory is proposed. Among other things, it does not only explain norms as effects of externalities (as Coleman’s theory), but also as signals to express distinctiveness and group commitment (with the example of the Hells Angels motor club). Coleman’s theory is further modified by integrating from Ellickson’s theory a set of variables that intervene between the exogenous variable “close social relationships†and the origin of norms. The model includes transaction costs and cooperation as intervening factors. Furthermore, “overarching norms†(from Ellickson’s research) is added as a new condition for the origin of norms.

Suggested Citation

  • Karl-Dieter Opp, 2026. "How to integrate theories of norm emergence. The example of James S. Coleman’s and Robert C. Ellickson’s theories," Rationality and Society, , vol. 38(1), pages 6-41, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:38:y:2026:i:1:p:6-41
    DOI: 10.1177/10434631251390297
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    References listed on IDEAS

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