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Rational irrationality: A conceptual defense

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  • Aylon Manor

Abstract

In his recent critique of rational irrationality, Spencer Paulson argues that the concept fails as an explanation of voter behavior because it cannot account for the inherent nature of policy beliefs as commitments to action and is therefore reflectively unstable. This paper defends rational irrationality against Paulson’s critique by examining two key distinctions between voting behavior and Paulson’s toxin puzzle analogy: the role of feasibility in connecting beliefs to practical commitments, and the fundamentally different epistemic processes involved in forming political versus non-political beliefs. By situating these distinctions within Herbert Simon’s bounded rationality framework, I show that rational irrationality remains a coherent and parsimonious explanation for why individuals who demonstrate rationality across most domains exhibit systematic biases specifically in political reasoning.

Suggested Citation

  • Aylon Manor, 2025. "Rational irrationality: A conceptual defense," Rationality and Society, , vol. 37(3), pages 395-420, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:37:y:2025:i:3:p:395-420
    DOI: 10.1177/10434631251343981
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    2. Herbert A. Simon, 1955. "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 69(1), pages 99-118.
    3. Spencer Paulson, 2024. "The very idea of rational irrationality," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 23(1), pages 3-21, February.
    4. Loren Lomasky, 2008. "Swing and a myth: a review of Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 469-484, June.
    5. Bryan Caplan, 2007. "Introduction to The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies," Introductory Chapters, in: The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies, Princeton University Press.
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