Brown on Millâ€™s moral theory: A critical response
In this article, I argue that the reading of Mill that D.G. Brown presents in â€˜Millâ€™s Moral Theory: Ongoing Revisionismâ€™ is inconsistent with several key passages in Millâ€™s writings. I also show that a rule-utilitarian interpretation that is very close to the one developed by David Lyons is able to account for these passages without difficulty.
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