Sentient dignity and the plausible inclusion of animals

Dignity often serves as the cornerstone for a justification of rights. However, it has been criticised for its exclusion of nonhuman animals and many human individuals: dignity is traditionally grounded in a capacity that some but not all humans and animals possess, e.g. rationality. To successfully overcome this problem of exclusion, this article argues that we should adopt an account of sentient dignity, i.e. an account of dignity based on sentience alone. The article thus makes three contributions. First, it demonstrates that the basis of dignity has yet to receive a plausible justification. To illustrate this, it outlines the problem of exclusion, and it exposes three problems with a prominent solution offered by Pablo Gilabert. According to Gilabert's view, dignity should be based on several valuable capacities including rationality, sentience and cooperation, among others. However, basing dignity on several capacities (i) risks over-inflating the scope of dignity, (ii) struggles to account for internal complexity, and (iii) produces problematic moral distinctions. Second, the article argues that sentient dignity overcomes these three problems whilst being plausibly inclusive. Finally, it contends that an account of sentient dignity vindicates the non-redundancy of dignity, renders sociopolitical discourse philosophically coherent, and harnesses dignity's potential strategic value.