Policy Responses To The Collapse Of The Financial Sector: Introduction

The downturn in global economic activity that started in 2008 was turned into a major recession after the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. It appears that world output fell by more than 1 per cent in 2009, and OECD output probably fell by around 3½ per cent. The effects on output were more marked in the Euro Area and the UK than they were in the US or Canada, which partly reflects the policy responses chosen by Treasuries and Central Banks. The financial crisis that drove the recession affected banks in the US, the UK, the Euro Area and the rest of Europe rather more than it did those in Canada, Australia and Japan. However, recessions have been common, with only Australia and Poland appearing to avoid them. The financial crisis led rapidly to a freezing of trade credit, which caused world trade to decline very sharply at the beginning of 2009. The financial crisis also led to an increase in risk premia in investment decision-making and hence to a decline in the equilibrium capital output ratio, which caused a sharp reduction in the demand for capital goods. Combined with credit rationing effects for firms needing access to borrowing, this induced a collapse in investment. Trade channels made the crisis global, as did movements in exchange rates. Interest rates were cut sharply in the US, Europe and Japan, and approached levels seen in Japan for the previous decade. As a result the yen appreciated strongly, and the combination of the effects of this appreciation on competitiveness and the decline in investment goods trade meant that Japan suffered worse than most other countries, at least in the short term.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)