The pitfalls and perils of payment by results
The targets culture in UK public services that emerged during the past two decades fell foul of Goodhartâ€™s Law, which led to increases in complexity and bureaucracy to counteract the gaming of the system by frontline staff. The emergence of payment-by-results claims to avoid this pitfall, but in practice it is likely to be exactly the same. In fact, there are aspects of payment-by-results which are likely to skew public sector objectives even more thoroughly than targets.
Volume (Year): 26 (2011)
Issue (Month): 8 (December)
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