Party competition and the limits of electoral coercion: Evidence from Colombia

In democracies around the world, armed non-state actors often use force to influence the outcome of elections. These actors leverage the threat of violence to deter candidates they oppose and intimidate voters into turning out for politicians they favor. But we know little about when these attempts succeed or fail. I show that the effectiveness of coercive interventions in elections is inhibited by local party competition. Competitive electoral constituencies attract attention and investment from parties, political elites, and civil society, restricting the ability of armed actors to successfully coerce voters and politicians. I evaluate this argument against evidence from a paradigmatic case of violent intervention in elections: the attempted capture of the 2002 Colombian Senate elections by the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). I find that the AUC’s efforts to channel votes toward allied politicians succeeded in party strongholds but overwhelmingly failed in competitive constituencies. Mechanism tests provide evidence that this relationship operates through the channels I theorize. Robust democratic competition, these results suggest, may offer a bulwark against the violent capture of democracy.