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Environmental protection after civil war: A difference-in-geographic-discontinuity approach

Author

Listed:
  • Kyosuke Kikuta

    (Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization, Japan)

  • Yuta Kamahara

    (Institute of Urban Innovation, Yokohama National University, Japan)

Abstract

Although civil war devastates the environment, we still do not understand the role of environmental policies in post-war countries and often have a pessimistic view without empirical evidence. This study challenges this view by arguing that the introduction of independent monitoring mechanisms can make environmental regulations effective even in post-war countries and also by exploiting analytical opportunities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In 2011–2013, the government implemented independent monitoring mechanisms to lessen the side effects of mining activities on deforestation. The reform, however, only applied to mining permit zones, which had arbitrary grid-based shapes. This allows combining a geographic regression discontinuity and difference-in-differences to a difference-in-geographic-discontinuity (DiGD) design. With satellite-based data available at every 30 metres for over 40 million cells in the DRC, the analysis indicates that the 2011–2013 reform decreased deforestation rates immediately inside the mining permit zones. The effect existed even in the areas of continuing armed conflicts. Further analysis of causal mechanisms suggests that the 2011–2013 reform facilitated the compliance of existing operators and also screened out incompliant operators. Overall, these findings imply that the environmental effects of civil war can depend on post-war policies — a missing link in the literature on environmental security.

Suggested Citation

  • Kyosuke Kikuta & Yuta Kamahara, 2025. "Environmental protection after civil war: A difference-in-geographic-discontinuity approach," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 62(3), pages 738-752, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:joupea:v:62:y:2025:i:3:p:738-752
    DOI: 10.1177/00223433241249329
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    References listed on IDEAS

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