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Dueling incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Dara Kay Cohen

    (Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota)

  • Amelia Hoover Green

    (Department of Political Science, Yale University)

Abstract

Transnational advocacy organizations are influential actors in the international politics of human rights. While political scientists have described several methods these groups use – particularly a set of strategies termed ‘information politics’ – scholars have yet to consider the effects of these tactics beyond their immediate impact on public awareness, policy agendas or the behavior of state actors. This article investigates the information politics surrounding sexual violence during Liberia’s civil war. We show that two frequently-cited ‘facts’ about rape in Liberia are inaccurate, and consider how this conventional wisdom gained acceptance. Drawing on the Liberian case and findings from sociology and economics, we develop a theoretical framework that treats inaccurate claims as an effect of ‘dueling incentives’ – the conflict between advocacy organizations’ needs for short-term drama and long-term credibility. From this theoretical framework, we generate hypotheses regarding the effects of information politics on (1) short-term changes in funding for human rights advocacy organizations, (2) short-term changes in human rights outcomes, (3) the institutional health of humanitarian and human rights organizations, and (4) long-run outcomes for the ostensible beneficiaries of such organizations. We conclude by outlining a research agenda in this area, emphasizing the importance of empirical research on information politics in the human rights realm, and particularly its effects on the lives of aid recipients.

Suggested Citation

  • Dara Kay Cohen & Amelia Hoover Green, 2012. "Dueling incentives," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 49(3), pages 445-458, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:joupea:v:49:y:2012:i:3:p:445-458
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    References listed on IDEAS

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