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Simulating Economic Sanctions and Incentives: Hypothetical Alternatives of United States Policy on South Africa

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  • Gisela Hübner-Dick

    (University of Frankfurt and University of Giessen)

  • Reimund Seidelmann

    (University of Frankfurt and University of Giessen)

Abstract

This paper reports on a part of a pure computer simulation model concerning the inter dependencies and mutual influence of the dyad US — South Africa within the international system. The feedback model is based on several theoretical assumptions and constructed along the principles of Forrester's system dynamics; its initial values and parameters are based on empirical data, the latter calculated by means of statistical procedures. The model attempts to find out how computer simulation can contribute to better knowledge and to the analysis of process behaviour in the international system.The main question is to what extent a change in US policy on South Africa can influence the socio-economic and the political development of South Africa towards liberalizing the government's racial policy. Five experiments were run to answer this question. One models the actual relationship between the US and South Africa, whereas the others deal with strategies of economic sanctions and incentives on the part of the US.The results of the different experiments show hardly any impact on the socio-economic situation, especially on the apartheid policy of South Africa. Economic crises simulated in the model are shifted to the black population. The consequences are reflected more strongly in the relational aspect itself. A US economic boycott strategy spills over into the political field of the dyadic relation, whereas an incentive strategy strengthens cooperation with South Africa and thereby benefits the white power elite.

Suggested Citation

  • Gisela Hübner-Dick & Reimund Seidelmann, 1978. "Simulating Economic Sanctions and Incentives: Hypothetical Alternatives of United States Policy on South Africa," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 15(2), pages 153-174, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:joupea:v:15:y:1978:i:2:p:153-174
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