Accurate Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Strategy

Certain 'arms controllers' defend SLBMs as 'ideally suited' to deterrence. But superpower nuclear strategy has nothing to do with deterrence. It concerns warfighting through counter force attacks on military targets. Soviet strategy especially emphasises the 'first strike', yet arms controllers have minimized Soviet capabilities and advocated appeasement.Examination of technical weapons systems characteristics and their impact on nuclear war fighting tactics shows that accurate SLBMs are especially useful to whoever strikes first and of little use to whoever is struck first. Their short range, speed, accuracy, flexibility and con cealment are ideally suited to surprise attack. In a first strike, they uniquely complement bombers, ICBMs and reconnaissance systems to advantage the attacker, where otherwise ad vantage might lie with the defence. SLBMs are officially 'quick reaction' and 'priority strike' forces for tactical and theatre targets, and will probably be the first 'strategic' forces used. But SLBM efficiency against hardened targets depends on completely vulnerable pre cision navigation systems like Omega, Loran C and satellites. Future developments like ma neuverable warheads will make accurate SLBMs even more useful in striking first, without diminishing their extreme vulnerability when struck first. Even as 'reserve deterrents', inac curate SLBMs are unlikely to survive longer than certain other forces. Thus arms controllers have defended a classical 'destabilizing' weapons system — the principal first strike forces on each side.The arms race is a 'rational' outcome of superpower contention for world domination and preparations for world war. Opposition cannot centre on international arms control agree ments, but must mobilize people against the superpowers, and especially against the super power that talks peace while preparing for war. Ultimately man, not weapons, is decisive. Western Europeans should get prepared to defend themselves.