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Bargaining with a Deadline: Evidence from the NBA

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  • Xin Nong
  • Weijing Huang

Abstract

Theoretical models show that reputational concerns provide a natural explanation for “deadline effects,†characterized by a surge of agreements reached just before a deadline in bargaining. This paper provides empirical evidence for this claim using a novel dataset on deadline trades from 30 National Basketball Association (NBA) teams between 2000 and 2024. The NBA imposes a publicly known deadline, after which teams cannot trade players for the remainder of the season. Our analysis reveals a statistically significant negative relationship between general managers’ tenure and the likelihood of making deadline trades, controlling for age and team performance. This pattern suggests that new managers, seeking to establish reputations as tough negotiators, are more likely to hold firm until the deadline. We also find that while 58 percent of deadline trades involve important assets, they have no systematic effect on subsequent team performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Xin Nong & Weijing Huang, 2026. "Bargaining with a Deadline: Evidence from the NBA," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 27(3), pages 283-308, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:27:y:2026:i:3:p:283-308
    DOI: 10.1177/15270025251409666
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