IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jospec/v27y2026i3p283-308.html

Bargaining with a Deadline: Evidence from the NBA

Author

Listed:
  • Xin Nong
  • Weijing Huang

Abstract

Theoretical models show that reputational concerns provide a natural explanation for “deadline effects,†characterized by a surge of agreements reached just before a deadline in bargaining. This paper provides empirical evidence for this claim using a novel dataset on deadline trades from 30 National Basketball Association (NBA) teams between 2000 and 2024. The NBA imposes a publicly known deadline, after which teams cannot trade players for the remainder of the season. Our analysis reveals a statistically significant negative relationship between general managers’ tenure and the likelihood of making deadline trades, controlling for age and team performance. This pattern suggests that new managers, seeking to establish reputations as tough negotiators, are more likely to hold firm until the deadline. We also find that while 58 percent of deadline trades involve important assets, they have no systematic effect on subsequent team performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Xin Nong & Weijing Huang, 2026. "Bargaining with a Deadline: Evidence from the NBA," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 27(3), pages 283-308, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:27:y:2026:i:3:p:283-308
    DOI: 10.1177/15270025251409666
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/15270025251409666
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/15270025251409666?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kathryn E. Spier, 1992. "The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 93-108.
    2. Muhamet Yildiz, 2003. "Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 793-811, May.
    3. Shoshana Vasserman & Muhamet Yildiz, 2019. "Pretrial negotiations under optimism," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(2), pages 359-390, June.
    4. Mehmet Ekmekci & Hanzhe Zhang, 2025. "Reputational Bargaining with External Resolution Opportunities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 92(4), pages 2472-2501.
    5. Scott Wolford, 2007. "The Turnover Trap: New Leaders, Reputation, and International Conflict," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(4), pages 772-788, October.
    6. , & , & ,, 2012. "Optimal deadlines for agreements," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
    7. Stephen F. Ross, 2003. "Antitrust, Professional Sports, and the Public Interest," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 4(4), pages 318-331, November.
    8. Ponsati, Clara, 1995. "The deadline effect: A theoretical note," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(3-4), pages 281-285, June.
    9. Christian Deutscher & Arne Büschemann, 2016. "Does Performance Consistency Pay Off Financially for Players? Evidence From the Bundesliga," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 17(1), pages 27-43, January.
    10. Peter A. Groothuis & James Richard Hill, 2013. "Pay Discrimination, Exit Discrimination or Both? Another Look at an Old Issue Using NBA Data," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 14(2), pages 171-185, April.
    11. Rob Simmons, 2022. "Professional Labor Markets in the Journal of Sports Economics," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 23(6), pages 728-748, August.
    12. Hoang, Ha & Rascher, Dan, 1999. "The NBA, Exit Discrimination, and Career Earnings," MPRA Paper 3542, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Hajime Katayama & Hudan Nuch, 2011. "A game-level analysis of salary dispersion and team performance in the national basketball association," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(10), pages 1193-1207.
    14. Fershtman Chaim & Seidmann Daniel J., 1993. "Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 306-321, August.
    15. William Fuchs & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2013. "Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 219-243, November.
    16. Jack Fanning, 2016. "Reputational Bargaining and Deadlines," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1131-1179, May.
    17. Jonathan Renshon & Allan Dafoe & Paul Huth, 2018. "Leader Influence and Reputation Formation in World Politics," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 62(2), pages 325-339, April.
    18. Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S, 1992. "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 100-121, March.
    19. Roth, Alvin E & Murnighan, J Keith & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1988. "The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 806-823, September.
    20. Anthony C. Krautmann & John L. Solow, 2009. "The Dynamics of Performance Over the Duration of Major League Baseball Long-Term Contracts," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 10(1), pages 6-22, February.
    21. Dilip Abreu & Faruk Gul, 2000. "Bargaining and Reputation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 85-118, January.
    22. Ori Heffetz, 2011. "A Test of Conspicuous Consumption: Visibility and Income Elasticities," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 1101-1117, November.
    23. Pham, Hanh Song Thi & Tran, Hien Thi, 2020. "CSR disclosure and firm performance: The mediating role of corporate reputation and moderating role of CEO integrity," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 127-136.
    24. Dennis Coates & Bernd Frick & Todd Jewell, 2016. "Superstar Salaries and Soccer Success," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 17(7), pages 716-735, October.
    25. Sartori, Anne E., 2002. "The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(1), pages 121-149, January.
    26. Joseph Price & Justin Wolfers, 2010. "Racial Discrimination Among NBA Referees," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(4), pages 1859-1887.
    27. Alp Simsek & Muhamet Yildiz, 2016. "Durability, Deadline, and Election Effects in Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 22284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    28. John L. Solow & Anthony C. Krautmann, 2011. "A Nash Bargaining Model of the Salaries of Elite Free Agents," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 12(3), pages 309-316, June.
    29. Ma, Ching-To Albert & Manove, Michael, 1993. "Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1313-1339, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Emin Karagözoğlu & Martin G. Kocher, 2019. "Bargaining under time pressure from deadlines," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(2), pages 419-440, June.
    2. Karagözoğlu, Emin & Keskin, Kerim, 2018. "Time-varying fairness concerns, delay, and disagreement in bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 115-128.
    3. Alp Simsek & Muhamet Yildiz, 2016. "Durability, Deadline, and Election Effects in Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 22284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Francesc Dilmé, 2021. "The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with One-Sided Offers," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 063, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    5. Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2021. "Optimal delay in committees," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 449-475.
    6. Colin F. Camerer & Gideon Nave & Alec Smith, 2019. "Dynamic Unstructured Bargaining with Private Information: Theory, Experiment, and Outcome Prediction via Machine Learning," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1867-1890, April.
    7. , & , & ,, 2012. "Optimal deadlines for agreements," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
    8. Mehmet Ekmekci & Hanzhe Zhang, 2021. "Reputational Bargaining with Ultimatum Opportunities," Papers 2105.01581, arXiv.org.
    9. Gneezy, Uri & Haruvy, Ernan & Roth, Alvin E., 2003. "Bargaining under a deadline: evidence from the reverse ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 347-368, November.
    10. Dilmé, Francesc, 2025. "Bargaining with binary private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 423-442.
    11. Marco Serena, 2021. "The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 377-397, June.
    12. Wei Zhang & Jingqi Wang & Reza Ahmadi & Sriram Dasu, 2021. "Timing the Price Agreement in High‐Tech Component Procurement," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(11), pages 4105-4120, November.
    13. Fanning, Jack, 2018. "No compromise: Uncertain costs in reputational bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 518-555.
    14. Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini & Raul Caruso & Marco Di Domizio, 2021. "Relative wages, payroll structure and performance in soccer. Evidence from Italian Serie A (2007-2019)," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Politica Economica dipe0015, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    15. Iriberri, Nagore & Hernandez-Arenaz, Iñigo, 2022. "Gender Differences in Alternating-Offer Bargaining: An Experimental Study," CEPR Discussion Papers 12561, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    16. Haruo Imai & Hannu Salonen, 2012. "A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 603-622, August.
    17. Bingchao Huangfu & Gagan Ghosh & Heng Liu, 2023. "Resource inequality in the war of attrition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 33-61, March.
    18. Deepak Somaya & Christine A. McDaniel, 2012. "Tribunal Specialization and Institutional Targeting in Patent Enforcement," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 23(3), pages 869-887, June.
    19. Hong Luo & Julie Holland Mortimer, 2017. "Copyright Enforcement: Evidence from Two Field Experiments," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 499-528, June.
    20. Tore Ellingsen & Topi Miettinen, 2007. "Disagreement and Authority," Jena Economics Research Papers 2007-037, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:27:y:2026:i:3:p:283-308. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.