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When Fairness is Unfair: Norm Abandonment in Bargaining and Its Implications for Peace Negotiations

Author

Listed:
  • Vinh Pham
  • Linjia Jiang
  • Yoshio Kamijo

Abstract

Fairness perceptions can significantly impact the instigation and resolution of conflicts. To examine how fairness norms shape agreements, we conduct an experiment, where participants first select a preferred rule between equal division, equal gain, and proportional division. When paired with another sharing the same norm, participants decide whether to adhere to the projected division or negotiate a different outcome. Experimental results reveal that participants renege on the agreement more frequently when allocations are perceived as unfair to the self: high contributors in equal division and low contributors in proportional division. Furthermore, attachment to the initial norm is sturdiest for strict equality and weakest for proportionality. Equal gain, coinciding with the Nash bargaining solution, is the most favored at both preselection and negotiation outcomes. We discuss several applications of our findings in resolving international conflicts.

Suggested Citation

  • Vinh Pham & Linjia Jiang & Yoshio Kamijo, 2026. "When Fairness is Unfair: Norm Abandonment in Bargaining and Its Implications for Peace Negotiations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 70(2-3), pages 261-286, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:70:y:2026:i:2-3:p:261-286
    DOI: 10.1177/00220027251356643
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yoshio Kamijo & Koji Yokote, 2022. "Behavioral bargaining theory: Equality bias, risk attitude, and reference-dependent utility," Working Papers 2208, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    2. Martin Ottmann, 2020. "Peace for our time? Examining the effect of power-sharing on postwar rebellions," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(5), pages 617-631, September.
    3. D’Exelle, Ben & Gutekunst, Christine & Riedl, Arno, 2023. "The effect of gender and gender pairing on bargaining: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 205(C), pages 237-269.
    4. Corgnet, Brice & Sutan, Angela & Veszteg, Róbert F., 2011. "My teammate, myself and I: Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 347-355, August.
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