Anti-Reductionism, Methodological Individualism and Analytical Marxism

The issues surrounding alternative methodologies of explanation are of extreme importance in all areas of social science which apply any form of aggregate analysis. This paper assesses a number of alternative positions which have emerged in recent years in debates surrounding the development of a new school in progressive social thought, namely analytical Marxism. In the first part of this paper, the development and definition of analytical Marxism is traced out. In the second, the issue of reduction in the philosophy of science is considered, and it is claimed that reduction, which is often interpreted as an ontological claim, is, in reality a claim about the possibility of explanation. The third part of the paper rejects the “reductionism versus holism†oversimplification, claiming there are at least four methodologies of explanation: atomism, methodological individualism, anti-reductionism and radical holism. The latter two reject reductionism. The work of three analytical Marxists – Wright, Levine and Sober – is the reference point for this discussion. Their work is particularly pertinent since they do not advocate methodological individualism which typifies the approach of other analytical Marxists such as Roemer and Elster. In the final section, the relevance of this debate for a specific theme, class analysis, is considered, and the reductionist approach is shown to be problematic.