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The impact of political competition on low-carbon technology innovation: From the perspective of officials’ personal characteristics

Author

Listed:
  • Yaling Deng
  • Jingjing Wang
  • De Xia
  • Lulu Xu

Abstract

Political competition is reflected in the strategic interaction of regional government's behavioral motivation driven by “official tournament.†Especially since environmental protection was officially included in the official performance appraisal system in 2005, the interactive trend of local governments’ economic development and environmental protection is more obvious. The policy uncertainty caused by this interaction is a major challenge for the government to promote regional sustainable development. Different from previous studies that only focus on the impact of political competition on environmental governance, this paper studies the impact of political competition on the low-carbon technology innovation from the perspective of sustainable development. Combined with the characteristics of Provincial Party Secretaries and Provincial Governors, the influence mechanism of political competition on low-carbon technology innovation is analyzed based on the method of spatial dubin model. Firstly, it finds that political competition has a significant negative impact on low-carbon technology innovation in the region and its adjacent regions, which is mainly caused by the political competition of Provincial Governors, while the political competition of Provincial Party Secretaries has no significant impact on low-carbon technology innovation. Secondly, the results of the mediation effect test show that reducing the intensity of environmental regulation in exchange for economic growth and political promotion opportunities is one of the reasons why the political competition of Provincial Governors inhibits low-carbon technology innovation. Thirdly, the results of the heterogeneity test of official characteristics show that the age of Provincial Governors is less and the tenure is longer, the stronger the inhibiting effect of Provincial Governors’ political competition on low-carbon technology innovation is. These conclusions provide policy suggestions for enterprises to make environmental investment decisions under different political environments.

Suggested Citation

  • Yaling Deng & Jingjing Wang & De Xia & Lulu Xu, 2025. "The impact of political competition on low-carbon technology innovation: From the perspective of officials’ personal characteristics," Energy & Environment, , vol. 36(6), pages 2722-2748, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:engenv:v:36:y:2025:i:6:p:2722-2748
    DOI: 10.1177/0958305X231205516
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