China and India in the Indian Ocean Region

China and India have divergent political ideologies, characteristics, aspirations, anxieties, and hence their strategic perceptions and orientations differ. Their strategic interaction in southern Asia has for its backdrop the 1962 border conflict. In terms of maritime security, the Pacific–Indian Ocean continuum has become the centre of gravity post-9/11 with both China and India having long-term growth trajectories in terms of naval power, a process skewed in favour of the PLA Navy (PLAN). Cognisance of the maritime dependency index for energy and anxieties about secure sea-lines of communication (SLOC) by China and India give rise to a ‘Malacca dilemma’ and a ‘Hormuz dilemma’ respectively. The firm belief at the politico-military apex that Beijing’s future strategic profile and relevance is inexorably linked with its naval capability gives the PLAN a steadily increasing footprint in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Active political engagements and long-term port investments in the IOR by Beijing, though presented as benign, trigger concerns in India. These equations are influenced by a three-tiered strategic subalternity in Asia between the US (and its allies), China and India. The manner in which contested territoriality between the Asian neighbours will be resolved is the key on which future outcomes depend. While this may point towards China acquiring a military edge in the IOR, for India prudence, restraint and capacity-building remain vital.