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Committee Conflict in the Congressional Arena

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  • Philip Brenner

Abstract

When congressmen engage in conflict can their behavior be explained by their objective interests as elite decision makers in our society? Congressional conflict can have the consequence of encouraging participation by outsiders, because conflict is contagious. As decision makers, congressmen eschew uncontrollable interference with their deliberations. Conflict can also arouse an interest which is antagonistic to the hierarchic structure of American society, and such arousal is resisted by congressmen. The nature of the conflict over the Higher Education Act of 1972 indicates that, although these considerations alone did not govern congressmen's behavior, they were significantly involved in structuring the conflict. In the first instance one finds that, while the interests at stake were not likely to generate mass arousal, some congressmen did attempt to curtail conflict in order to discourage the involvement of outsiders. In the second instance one finds that congressmen shaped the conflict in a particular way, seemingly, in order to avoid consideration of how education is used to buttress the structure of our society and, thus, to avoid the awakening of mass interests which they recognized were real, though unarticulated. The structure of the committee system significantly contributes to the legislators' abilities to control conflict in at least five ways. In considering reforms of the system, congressmen will take into account the extent to which the reforms alter the committees' role in structuring congressional, conflict.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip Brenner, 1974. "Committee Conflict in the Congressional Arena," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 411(1), pages 87-101, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:anname:v:411:y:1974:i:1:p:87-101
    DOI: 10.1177/000271627441100108
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