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Proprietary Information Protection and the Long-Run Implications of Industrial Espionage

Author

Listed:
  • Carmelo Pierpaolo Parello

    () (Catholic University of Louvain
    Università di Viterbo "La Tuscia")

Abstract

This paper deals with proprietary information and industrial espionage. To obtain this goal, an innovation-based growth model is constructed where R&D employment is split into two types of researchers: inventors and spies. The paper provides an analysis of the steady-state effects of better enforcement of proprietary information protection in terms of a change of the institutional set-up devoted to intellectual property rights and private information protection. We find that there is only a temporary positive impact on the innovation rate, while there is permanent negative effect on the steady-state rate of spying and nominal wage.

Suggested Citation

  • Carmelo Pierpaolo Parello, 2005. "Proprietary Information Protection and the Long-Run Implications of Industrial Espionage," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 95(5), pages 91-124, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:95:y:2005:i:5:p:91-124
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D9 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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