Proprietary Information Protection and the Long-Run Implications of Industrial Espionage
This paper deals with proprietary information and industrial espionage. To obtain this goal, an innovation-based growth model is constructed where R&D employment is split into two types of researchers: inventors and spies. The paper provides an analysis of the steady-state effects of better enforcement of proprietary information protection in terms of a change of the institutional set-up devoted to intellectual property rights and private information protection. We find that there is only a temporary positive impact on the innovation rate, while there is permanent negative effect on the steady-state rate of spying and nominal wage.
Volume (Year): 95 (2005)
Issue (Month): 5 (September-October)
|Contact details of provider:|| |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:95:y:2005:i:5:p:91-124. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sabrina Marino)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.