Aging and Lobbying: Implications for Social Security
What is the impact of demographic changes on lobbying activities, when two opposite groups compete for obtaining a transfer from each other? This paper compares two lobbying models: good-intensive and time-intensive. Depending on the specification of the political technology of the pressure function, the two models obtain different predictions for the impact of demographic changes on the equilibrium size of the transfer. These results have strong implications for the PAYG social security transfers. If the pressure is good-intensive, an aging population implies a smaller social security transfer. If instead the pressure is time-intensive and it displays decreasing marginal returns to size, aging has a hump-shaped impact on the per capita social security transfer
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 93 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January-February)
|Contact details of provider:|| |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:93:y:2003:i:1:p:149-194. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sabrina Marino)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.