IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/rje/randje/v36y20053p661-679.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Mergers Under Entry

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Pesendorfer

    () (London School of Economics, CEPR, and NBER)

Abstract

I study merger incentives in a dynamic model under the presence of gradual entry. I consider a repeated game with merger decisions in every period and characterize the set of equilibria. I establish two properties: (i) a merger for monopoly may not be profitable; (ii) a merger in a nonconcentrated industry can be profitable. I illustrate the merger welfare implications in the Cournot model.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Pesendorfer, 2005. "Mergers Under Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(3), pages 661-679, Autumn.
  • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:36:y:2005:3:p:661-679
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Duarte Brito & Daniel Magueta, 2014. "Horizontal Mergers, Entry and International Trade," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 923-943, November.
    2. Breinlich, Holger & Nocke, Volker & Schutz, Nicolas, 2013. "Cross-Border Price Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions -- A Quantitative Framework for Competition Policy," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79837, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. MIYAGIWA, Kaz & WAN, Jiangyun(Yunyun), 2015. "The Merger Paradox and R&D," IIR Working Paper 15-21, Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    4. XiaoGang Che & Brad Humphreys, 2015. "Competition Between Sports Leagues: Theory and Evidence on Rival League Formation in North America," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(2), pages 127-143, March.
    5. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899, March.
    6. Mason, Robin & Weeds, Helen, 2013. "Merger policy, entry, and entrepreneurship," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 23-38.
    7. Ben Mermelstein & Volker Nocke & Mark A. Satterthwaite & Michael D. Whinston, 2014. "Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale Economies: A Computational Model of Optimal Merger Policy," NBER Working Papers 20051, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Przemysław Jeziorski, 2014. "Estimation of cost efficiencies from mergers: application to US radio," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(4), pages 816-846, December.
    9. Andrew F. Daughety, 2006. "Cournot Competition," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0620, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    10. Aydemir, Zava & Schmutzler, Armin, 2008. "Small scale entry versus acquisitions of small firms: Is concentration self-reinforcing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 133-146, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:36:y:2005:3:p:661-679. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://www.rje.org .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.