Mergers Under Entry
I study merger incentives in a dynamic model under the presence of gradual entry. I consider a repeated game with merger decisions in every period and characterize the set of equilibria. I establish two properties: (i) a merger for monopoly may not be profitable; (ii) a merger in a nonconcentrated industry can be profitable. I illustrate the merger welfare implications in the Cournot model.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 36 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.rje.org|
|Order Information:||Web: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:36:y:2005:3:p:661-679. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.