Transparency and Catching Up in a Monetary Union
We report transparency scores and growth indicators for the euro area and various classes of potential euro area candidates. We then study currency union stabilization when monetary policy transparency may be imperfect and supply conditions may be country-specific. Sectoral productivity shocks are found to reduce the effectiveness of the single monetary policy compared to monetary autonomy. For a small open economy, a wider cross-country gap in supply slopes (as induced by larger trade openness differentials) favors currency union participation. Small size hampers monetary union stabilization under supply shocks, but not when output target shocks are misperceived by the public.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:integr:0464. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jong-Eun Lee)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.