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The Economics and Politics of Safeguards - Political Economy of the Japanese Safeguard System for Agricultural Goods -


  • Harimaya, Kozo

    () (Sapporo Gakuin University)

  • Kagitani, Koichi

    () (Himeji Dokkyo University)


This paper investigates the effect of political factors on safeguards. We present a simple model to show the relationship between political factors and safeguards, and empirically examine whether the Japanese safeguard system was influenced by the political factors. Our empirical analysis shows that the Japanese safeguard system for agricultural products is not neutral to the WTO Agreement on Safeguards and it is distorted due to political reasons.

Suggested Citation

  • Harimaya, Kozo & Kagitani, Koichi, 2008. "The Economics and Politics of Safeguards - Political Economy of the Japanese Safeguard System for Agricultural Goods -," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 23, pages 927-952.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:integr:0459

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Andrea Bassanini & Stefano Scarpetta, 2001. "Does Human Capital Matter for Growth in OECD Countries?: Evidence from Pooled Mean-Group Estimates," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 282, OECD Publishing.
    2. Sala-i-Martin, Xavier X., 1996. "Regional cohesion: Evidence and theories of regional growth and convergence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 1325-1352, June.
    3. Dehejia, Vivek H., 1998. "Can standards immiserize?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 361-366, June.
    4. Cees van Beers, 1998. "Labour Standards and Trade Flows of OECD Countries," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 57-73, January.
    5. Gabriel Rodriguez & Yiagadeesen Samy, 2003. "Analysing the effects of labour standards on US export performance. A time series approach with structural change," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(9), pages 1043-1051.
    6. Richard A. Brecher, 1974. "Minimum Wage Rates and the Pure Theory of International Trade," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 88(1), pages 98-116.
    7. Alan B. Krueger, 1999. "From Bismarck to Maastricht: The March to European Union and the Labor Compact," Working Papers 803, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    8. Brecher, Richard A., 1974. "Optimal commercial policy for a minimum-wage economy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 139-149, May.
    9. Vivek Dehejia & Yiagadeesen Samy, 2004. "Trade and labour standards: theory and new empirical evidence," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(2), pages 179-198.
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    Cited by:

    1. Knobel, Alexander & Baeva, Marina, 2017. "Protective Measures in Integration Agreements and Their Impact on Mutual Trade and Trade with Third Countries: Features of Russia and the Countries of the Eurasian Economic Union," Working Papers 051735, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    2. Kagitani, Koichi & Harimaya, Kozo, 2015. "Safeguards and voluntary export restraints under the World Trade Organization," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 29-41.

    More about this item


    safeguards; lobbying;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations


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