Strategic Export Policy in the Presence of Subcontracting
This paper examines the optimal export policies when ex ante negotiation over subcontract manufacturing occurs between two competing international-firms. It show that it could be optimal for the exporting country to adopt either a different or a parallel trade policy between the two exporting goods (the final product and the subcontracted product). However, a different trade policy that taxes the finalproduct export and subsidizes the subcontracted-product export is not ever optimal. When the exporting firm is a pure subcontractor, taxing the single export (subcontracted product) becomes the only optimal trade policy of the exporting country. Morever, the exporting country imposes a less aggressive trade policy in response given that the importing country inflicts a more aggressive trade policy.
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Volume (Year): 22 (2007)
Issue (Month): ()
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